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ABSTRACT 
Argentina and Guatemala are separated by more than 3,000 miles, and their societies are 
in many ways dissimilar. Yet they share similarities in the undermining of democracy 
throughout their histories. Both countries were caught up in the Western fear of 
communism during the Cold War. With considerable backing from the United States, 
both countries crafted military governments with the mission of better governance and 
removal of their internal communist threats. Human rights were repeatedly violated by 
militaries and terrorists alike in each country. Both countries began democratizing in the 
1980s; however, Argentina has made great strides toward democratic consolidation and 
civil-military relations reform.  For Guatemala, these goals remain elusive. 
The Argentine case study serves to validate the mode-of-transition argument, 
which states that the dynamics of the transition to democracy deeply affect democratic 
consolidation and civilian control of the military. This case study, however, argues that 
Argentine civil society was a pivotal factor in preventing the military from controlling the 
transition. Civil society affected the outcome via protests and political participation.  
The Guatemalan case study also validates the mode-of-transition argument. This 
case study illustrates the negative consequences whenever the transition is under military 
control. It also supports the argument that civil society’s actions are a pivotal factor in 
determining the military’s ability to control the transition, via its active protesting of the 
regime and its participation in the electoral process, or lack thereof. In Guatemala’s case, 
civil society participated in politics early on; over time, however, its participation 
dwindled. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
Argentina and Guatemala are separated by more than 3,000 miles and their 
societies are in many ways dissimilar. Yet they share similarities in the undermining of 
democracy throughout their histories. Both countries were caught up in the Western fear 
of communism during the Cold War. With considerable backing from the United States, 
both countries crafted military governments with the mission of better governance and 
removal of their internal communist threats. Militaries and terrorists alike in each country 
repeatedly violated human rights. 
Both countries began democratizing in the 1980s; however, Argentina has made 
great strides toward democratic consolidation and civil-military relations reform. For 
Guatemala, these goals remain elusive. What factors enabled progressive reform in 
Argentina and prevented the same level of reform from occurring in Guatemala? This is 
the question explored in this thesis. 
B. IMPORTANCE  
The process of achieving democratic consolidation and civilian control of the 
military is a convoluted path, and democratizing countries often stray from it. As 
Argentina has followed its repressive military regime (1976–1983) with a democratic 
transition and 30 years of uninterrupted democracy, its success merits careful analysis. 
Lessons from Argentina’s success may be applicable to other democratizing states. In the 
case of Guatemala, an understanding of what has stalled reform may prevent other states 
from undermining their own democratic transition.  
The people of these two countries suffered extensive human rights violations at 
the hands of the government, and it can be argued that democracy should be installed in 
order to hold governments accountable to their citizens and reduce the risk of human 
rights violations. The knowledge of what determines success or failure in a democratic 
transition is a key requirement in the international pursuit of freedom and democracy. 
According to the democratic peace theory, promoting democracy helps promote global 
 2 
peace. Lessons from the attempts to deal with the legacies of authoritarianism in 
Argentina and Guatemala may be applicable to countries democratizing in the 21st 
century. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
When evaluating a transition to democracy and the concomitant establishment of 
civilian control of the military, it is necessary to comprehend the obstacles to success. 
This study seeks to understand why success has been accomplished and what obstacles 
Argentina had to overcome. Alternatively, the study explores why Guatemala’s transition 
to democracy has not resulted in vast civil-military relations reform. Guatemala still 
struggles with internal security issues that require heavy military involvement. 
Additionally, this study examines the feasibility of applying the lessons of Argentina to 
Guatemala, or any other transitioning state.  
This thesis argues that Argentina has achieved success in democratic transition 
and civil-military relations reform because it had a discredited military—unable to 
control the transition process—and a lively resurrected civil society demanding reform. 
The opposite conditions existed in Guatemala, resulting in the lack of success seen today. 
Therefore, I hypothesize that three conditions must be met in order for a transitioning 
democracy to succeed in implementing full civilian control of the military. First, the type 
and form of transition toward democracy matters, as it usually determines political 
winners and losers. All things being equal, quick transitions tend to generate more 
positive outcomes for civilian control, as opposed to drawn-out transitions. Second, the 
extent to which the military exercises influence on the process is also important. If the 
armed forces emerge from the transition with relative institutional strength, then the 
chances for civil-military reform erode, as soldiers may impose prerogatives and reserve 
domains as a pre-condition for their return to the barracks. Finally, successful civilian 
control of the military requires pressure from below, in which civil society demands 
reform, and shapes both legislation and policy.   
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D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Before contemplating why Argentina has been successful in achieving democratic 
civilian control of the military and Guatemala has not, it is necessary to have an 
understanding of the process of democratization, the concept of civil-military relations, 
and the nature of each country’s conflict that led to vast human rights violations 
committed by military regimes. The literature on democratization provides explanations 
as to how and why authoritarian regimes fall, while the civil-military relations literature 
theorizes on what it means to have full democratic civilian control of the military, how it 
is achieved, or why it fails to take root. Lastly, reviewing the root causes of conflict in 
each country serves to explain the environment that enabled human rights violations.  
1. The Democratization Literature 
Argentina’s and Guatemala’s transition to democracy occurred during the period 
known as the Third Wave of Democratization, in which authoritarian regimes transitioned 
toward democracy following a domino effect, starting with Portugal in 1974, then Spain 
in 1978, and Argentina in 1982. In order to analyze the democratization process, I 
examined the characteristics of military regimes and their effects on society. In the 
context of those regimes, the modes of transitions to democracy and the endpoint of 
democratic consolidation were evaluated. 
Military regimes in Latin America were progressively more repressive. Having 
come to power believing democracy had failed, the military sought to consolidate its 
power and deter challenges to it. In order to achieve this, laws were passed prohibiting 
speech against the government. Additionally, political parties were prohibited, or at least 
severely restricted, and legislatures were often disbanded.
1
 Military regimes demanded 
complete loyalty from their citizens. Anyone who voiced opposition was labeled a 
subversive and subjected to torture or even death. As neighbors and loved ones 
“disappeared,” an environment of fear set in.2 
                                                 
 1 Patricia Weiss Fagen, “Repression and State Security,” in Fear at the Edge: State Terror and 
Resistance in Latin America, ed. Juan E. Corradi, Patricia Weiss Fagen, and Manuel Antonio Garretón 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 40–49.  
 2 Manuel Antonio Garretón, “Fear in Military Regimes,” in Fear at the Edge, 17–19. 
 4 
As the literature indicates, the nature of the transition to democracy is largely 
dependent on who initiates it. According to Samuel Huntington, there are three types of 
transitions: transformation, replacement, and transplacement. “Transformation” occurs 
when reformers within a regime are able to initiate change from within, thus changing the 
structure of the existing government.
3
 “Replacements” occur when the transition is 
initiated by regime opponents from outside and results in the ruling regime’s collapse.4 
The third transition, “transplacement,” occurs when moderates within the regime and 
outside opponents share the transition process.
5
 This transition is similar to what Juan J. 
Linz and Alfred Stepan call reforma pactada—ruptura pactada. They claim that reforms 
implemented within an authoritarian regime lead to its eventual rupture, enabling a new 
government to take root.
6
   
The determination of which transition offers the best possibility of consolidation 
has been long debated in academia. “Replacements” are indicative of regime collapse as a 
result of internal power struggles or mass societal uprisings. Some scholars identify civil 
uprisings as inherently dangerous to consolidation because they risk provoking strong 
authoritarian reactions from the failing government. Nancy Bermeo, however, identifies 
contrary examples—such as Portugal, Peru, and the Philippines—where society’s 
demands resulted in consolidation.
7
 Successful “transformations” are conditioned by the 
outgoing regime’s willingness to continue democratization. Linz and Stepan argue that in 
transitions that are initiated and controlled by the outgoing authoritarian regime, there is a 
possibility of a democratically disloyal transfer of power. A democratically disloyal 
transfer occurs when the outgoing regime tries to limit the authority of the incoming 
democratic government by enacting legal restraints to remain in place after the transfer, 
                                                 
 3 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 124. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
 6 Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern 
Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1996), 61. 
 7 Nancy Bermeo, “Myths of Moderation: Confrontation and Conflict during Democratic Transitions,” 
Comparative Politics 29, no. 3 (April 1997): 305–319. 
 5 
for example, in Chile.
8
 This increases when the former regime is led by a hierarchical 
military institution (or junta), as were Argentina and Guatemala. 
Once a transition occurs, it takes time for democracy to consolidate. Linz and 
Stepan offer five requirements that are indicative of a democratic consolidation: 1) a free 
and lively civil society,
9
 2) an autonomous and valued political society, 3) a rule of law, 
4) a state bureaucracy conducive to democratic government, and 5) an institutionalized 
economic society.
10
 For these five things to occur, society must have faith in the 
institutions of government. If the state cannot function in its bureaucratic roles or be seen 
as an efficient and impartial upholder of the law, it will not garner the support of society. 
When a state has lost its legitimacy, it risks failure, and democracy can thus be 
interrupted. 
Although not listed as a key requirement, Linz and Stepan also state that when 
consolidation follows a prior military regime, the ability to gain civilian control of the 
military becomes an essential task.
11
 As Argentina and Guatemala have both experienced 
military regimes, the issue of democratic civilian control of the military is a viable goal 
that must be achieved in order to reduce the risk of a breakdown of democracy. 
In conclusion, from this literature we learn why democratic consolidation is a 
formidable achievement in post-authoritarian countries. Argentina and Guatemala both 
experienced military regimes, but transitioned in different manners. In Argentina, the 
military junta quickly exited shortly after its embarrassing defeat in the 
Malvinas/Falklands War and after civil society began to actively protest its reign. In 
Guatemala, the military controlled the democratic transition in 1985 and was therefore 
able to implement a democratically disloyal transfer of power.  
                                                 
 8 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 72. 
 9 This is indicative of what Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter label the “Resurrection of 
Society.” See Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies 
(Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), 48–56. 
 10 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, 7. 
11 Ibid., 67. 
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2. The Civilian-Military Relations Literature 
The relation between the military and civilian authorities is a critical component 
of any democracy. Democratic governments must be elected and held accountable by 
their citizens. As the military is not popularly elected, democracy cannot exist without 
civilian control of the military. Since the level of civilian control bears so much weight 
on the democratization process, this thesis must consider how civilian control can be 
achieved. 
The seminal work on civil-military relations is Samuel Huntington’s The Soldier 
and the State. Huntington states that there are two different types of civilian control: 
subjective and objective. A country with subjective civilian control of the military is one 
that has achieved civilian power through the weakening of military institutions. A state 
that has achieved objective civilian control is able to maximize the autonomy of its armed 
forces without fear of domestic repercussions. In objective control, the officer corps is 
professional. Huntington defines professionalism as the existence of an apolitical military 




J. Samuel Fitch defines civilian control based upon the armed forces’ ability to 
meet three requirements: 1) they are politically subordinate to civilian authority; 2) they 
follow the rule of law; and 3) they follow the policies established by duly constituted 
civilian authorities.
13
  This definition closely matches Richard H. Kohn’s interpretation of 
civilian control in mature democracies, which implies civilian supremacy in the 
establishment of military policy. By contrast, unstable democracies are faced with the 
immediate challenge of preventing possible coups before they can achieve full control 
over all facets of the armed forces.
14
  
                                                 
 12 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory of Politics of Civil-Military Relations 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1957), 80–84. 
 13 J. Samuel Fitch, “Military Attitudes Toward Democracy in Latin America: How Do We Know If 
Anything Has Changed?” in Civil-Military Relations in Latin America: New Analytical Perspectives, ed. 
David Pion-Berlin (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 62–63. 
 14 Richard H. Kohn, “How Democracies Control the Military,” Journal of Democracy 8, no. 4 (1997): 
140–142. 
 7 
Alfred Stepan offers an explanation for why Latin American militaries did not act 
professionally in the context of Huntington’s definition. In his essay, “The New 
Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion,” Stepan claims that the 
military developed political and managerial skills, which they then viewed as part of their 
internal security missions. The military had come to believe that, in comparison to their 
civilian counterparts, they were better fit to implement doctrinal changes and implement 
development programs. After overthrowing democratic presidents, the military did not 
return power to civilians.
15
  
As has been mentioned earlier, the restoration of civilian control of the military is 
a requirement for democracy, but its achievement comes after substantial changes are 
made to the nature of the military institution. The success of these changes has varied 
from one country to another. Felipe Agüero argues that if the military is able to control 
the transition process, then the possibility of achieving civilian control is significantly 
reduced.
16
 A civilian-led transition has a greater chance of prohibiting the military from 
instituting roadblocks and safeguards in the new democracy.
17
 Civilian-led transitions 
require steadfast pressure from civil society demanding reforms. As far as what causes 
civil society to demand reforms, Harold Trinkunas offers this:  
Only in countries where civil society has mobilized around the issues of 
human rights abuses under a previous authoritarian regime is civilian 
control likely to be major domestic political issue. Civilian control, 
therefore, is likely to be institutionalized only when elected officials 
commit themselves to its pursuit.
18
 
Additional factors affecting reforms are issues of military contestation and 
military prerogatives. As Stepan has argued, in the transition to civilian control, civilian 
authorities may find resistance in matters pertaining to the defense budget and size, 
                                                 
 15 Alfred Stepan, “The New Professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Expansion,” in 
Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future, ed. Alfred Stepan (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1973), 47–53. 
 16 Agüero, “Institutions, Transitions, and Bargaining: Civilians and the Military in Shaping 
Postauthoritarian Regimes,” 197. 
 17 Ibid. 
 18 Harold A. Trinkunas, “Crafting Civilian Control in Emerging Democracies: Argentina and 
Venezuela,” Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs (Fall 2000): 82. 
 8 
mission orientation, and any proposed punishment for grievances committed by the 
military regime.
19
 If the military has grown accustomed to prerogatives, such as complete 
autonomy and the holding of government offices, then as an institution it will seek to 
limit the loss of those prerogatives.
20
 Furthermore, newly established democratic 
governments that hold criminal trials to punish the military, risk creating coup-prone 
environments by alienating the institution the government seeks to control. Jack L. 
Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri have studied various transitioning states and have come to 




The literature poses interesting questions when applied in the context of 
Argentina and Guatemala. In Argentina, the military stepped down, realizing that it was 
unable to govern effectively, yet it still openly protested subordination to civilian control, 
specifically in regard to the human rights trials. This led President Carlos Menem to 
implement amnesty for all the armed forces. Today, however, the military is under a 
civilian defense ministry, follows civilian established policies, and remains under the rule 
of law, even after human rights trials recommenced in the early 2000s. The Guatemalan 
military was not subject to criminal charges and did accept some civil-military relations 
reform, but it is still not under a civilian defense ministry and remains heavily involved in 
internal security.   
3. Analyses of Causes of Conflict in Argentina and Guatemala, and Post-
Conflict Environment 
The process of democratic consolidation and civil-military relations in post-
authoritarian states is linked to the history of conflicts preceding it and the manner in 
which their resolution is pursued. In order to capture the nature of conflict in Argentina, I  
relied primarily on the insights developed by Paul H. Lewis’s, Guerrillas and Generals: 
                                                 
 19 Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1988), 68–69. 
20 Ibid., 92–99. 
 21 Jack L. Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri, “Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies of 
International Justice,” International Security 28, no. 3 (Winter 2003): 43–44. 
 9 
The “Dirty War” in Argentina, and Maria José Moyano’s, Argentina’s Lost Patrol: 
Armed Struggle, 1969–1979. The study of Guatemala’s conflict is based upon Guatemala 
Never Again, a report completed by the Recovery of Historical Memory Project 
(REMHI); the Official Report of the Human Rights Office, Archdiocese of Guatemala; 
Victoria Sanford’s Buried Secrets: Truth and Human Rights in Guatemala; and other 
scholarly articles.22  
Lewis traces the root of Argentina’s conflict to an oligarchy refusing to accept 
mass politics. He claims that once universal male suffrage was granted in 1912, the elites 
of Argentina were no longer able to dominate the government. This broadening of 
democracy threatened the elite’s superior economic and political position and prompted 
regular military interventions in the democratic process, starting in 1930. What Lewis 
calls “social malaise” set in, until the charismatic Juan Perón was ushered into power.23 
Perón was removed via a military coup in 1955, which eventually set off a massive 
guerrilla movement determined to restore Peronism.
24
 They achieved their goal, but were 
dissatisfied by Perón’s second presidency.25 Their constant use of violence brought in the 
most repressive military regime in Argentina’s history in 1976, culminating in the Dirty 
War. The military labeled all guerrillas “subversives” and set about to save Argentina 
from the likes of communism. More than 20,000 people died during the Dirty War.
26
  
Moyano focuses on the militarization of the internal political disputes. Once the 
guerilla movement began in the 1960s, a generation grew up believing political activity 
was synonymous with violence. The ability of guerilla groups to socialize its members 
into violence played a key role in pushing Argentina toward the Dirty War. The failure of 
guerilla movements to cease violent activities after achieving their objective of returning 
                                                 
 22 Paul H. Lewis, Guerrillas and Generals: The “Dirty War” in Argentina (Westport, CT: Praeger, 
2002); María José Moyano, Argentina’s Lost Patrol: Armed Struggle, 1969–1979 (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1995); Archdiocese of Guatemala, Guatemala Never Again! The Official Report of the 
Human Rights Office (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1999); Victoria Sanford, Buried Secrets: Truth and 
Human Rights in Guatemala (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). 
23 Lewis, Guerrillas and Generals, 4–8. 
24 Ibid., 4. 
25 Ibid., 88–95. 
26 Ibid., 97–128. 
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Perón to power paved the way for the final military coup of 1976. Their violence enabled 
the military to legitimate the coup and the subsequent repression.
27
 
Both authors speak to the resurrection of civil society toward the end of military 
rule in 1983. The Madres de la Plaza de Mayo, or Mothers of Plaza de Mayo, marched 
every Thursday in silent protest demanding information about their “disappeared” loved 
ones. Their status as defenseless women in public and their numbers improved their 
safety, while protesting proved to be an effective means of delivering their message to the 
international arena.
28
 Even though civil society began to actively protest, Alfred Stepan 
states that the military’s defeat by the British was the tipping point causing the regime’s 
exit because officers no longer felt willing or able to govern.
29
 The end of the Dirty War 
established the hypothesized conditions necessary for democratic consolidation and civil-
military relations reform. The military lost legitimacy and held little influence over the 
democratic process resulting in President Raúl Alfonsín’s (1983–1989) election. 
Furthermore, Alfonsín campaigned on a platform demanding accountability for the 
military’s crimes, and his victory was the evidence of civil society demanding democratic 
and civil-military reforms. 
Guatemala Never Again provides an extensive historical context for the 
Guatemalan conflict. Although the guerilla movement did not begin as an ethnic conflict, 
Guatemala had been plagued with ethnic repression since its founding. The indigenous 
Maya make up 60 percent of the population, yet they hold the least amount of land 
ownership and have the highest percentages of poverty. The relative isolation of the 
Mayas in Guatemala’s political system made them an easy target in the 36-year civil 
war.
30
 The guerilla movement began after the 1954 CIA (Central Intelligence Agency)-
sponsored coup d’état that resulted in a military government. This led to violence 
erupting throughout the country and the military proclaiming a war against communism. 
                                                 
 27 Moyano, Argentina’s Lost Patrol, 156–165. 
28 Lewis, Guerrillas and Generals, 186–187. 
 29 Alfred Stepan, “State Power and the Strength of Civil Society in the Southern Cone of Latin 
America,” in Bringing the State Back In, ed. Peter Evans, Dietrick Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 331. 
30 Archdiocese of Guatemala, Guatemala Never Again!, 181–189. 
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The Guatemalan military’s capability vastly exceeded that of the guerrillas, resulting in 
their retreat to the indigenous filled highlands.
31
  
Both the archdiocese’s investigators and Sanford received countless victims’ 
accounts of the war and its atrocities. The victims’ memories and evidence of massacres 
tell of attempted genocide of an ethnic group that did not cause the conflict.
32
 Both the 
guerillas and the army threatened civilians.
33
 The genocidal nature of the conflict became 
apparent when General Efraín Ríos Montt commenced his “scorched earth” campaign, 
saying he would “take the water away from the fish.”  He labeled the Maya the “water” 
that had to be drained in order to kill the guerillas, the “fish.”34 
The military held elections in 1985, but in the democratic transition were able to 
hold firm to their prerogatives.
35
 It was not until the peace accords were signed in 1996 
that some changes in civil-military relations occurred. The peace accords, however, were 
agreed upon by the army and the guerillas, and provided amnesty for almost all crimes, 
leaving justice incapable of being rendered.
36
 Furthermore, the indigenous majority 
remained isolated during the peace process, only having a voice through the guerillas. 
Racist attitudes had become institutionalized throughout the Guatemalan government 
during the course of the war. Even the Procuraduría de los Derechos Humanos (PDH, or 
Human Rights Ombudsman), which was established in 1985, was infested with racist 
personnel who could not communicate in the native tongue of the victims, thus denying 
the majority of the population a voice.
37
 The resolution period (1985–1996), created 
conditions opposite to those found in Argentina. The military fostered a transformation 
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and was therefore able to exert significant control of the process. Civil society did not 
mobilize because it was divided along ethnic lines. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis is a comparative study of Argentina and Guatemala. It relies on the 
democratization literature to assess the evolution of civil-military reform in the two 
identified countries. In each case study, specific attention is focused on who initiated and 
led the transition, the level of civil-societal participation, and each military’s response to 
reform. From each case study, commonalities and differences can be identified to answer 
the research question. 
In addition to material referred to in the literature review, this thesis relies 
extensively on scholarly journals and books pertaining to Argentina and Guatemala’s 
political system and human rights regime. Scholars Wendy Hunter and David Pion-Berlin 
offer valuable insight on Argentine civil-military relations, while J. Mark Ruhl provides 
an understanding of the reform process in Guatemala. It is the intent of this thesis to 
evaluate recent publications in the context of previously mentioned theories and draw 
definitive conclusions. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This study consists of four chapters. This chapter presented key arguments and 
reviewed the theoretical literature. Chapters II and III analyze, in depth, the transition to 
democracy and subsequent civil-military relations reform that occurred in Argentina, 
beginning in 1983, and in Guatemala, beginning in 1985. Chapter IV offers a comparison 
of both democratic transitions and lessons on how best to consolidate democracy and 




Argentina’s 1983 transition to democracy has produced continuous democratic 
rule for the past thirty years. Its successful movement toward democratic consolidation 
and establishment of civilian control over its armed forces is remarkable given its 
turbulent history. Having established democratic rule in 1853, Argentina succumbed to 
numerous periods of authoritarian rule from 1930 to 1983. The repetitive military 
intrusion into the government became expected and condoned, thereby undermining the 
security of democracy. The initial coups conformed to what Alfred Stepan has called the 
“moderating pattern” in civil-military relations, where the military intervene, fix political 
problems, and quickly hand over power to the civilians. By the 1960s, however, these 
coups conformed to what Guillermo O’Donnell has called “bureaucratic 
authoritarianism,” where the military and their civilian allies agree on long-term rule in 
order to carry out radical transformations.38 The military junta of 1976–1983, however, 
enacted the darkest chapter in Argentina’s history by introducing severe repression, 
torture, and other serious human rights violations. The military’s conduct, combined with 
governing failures, prompted Argentines to once again demand democratic rule. Their 
newfound voices and the political decisions of presidents Raul Alfonsín (1983–89) and 
Carlos Menem (1989–1999) guided Argentina toward its greatest movements in 
achieving democratic consolidation and the establishment of full civilian control of the 
armed forces. 
The Argentine case study serves to validate the mode-of-transition argument, in 
which the method of transition deeply affects democratic consolidation and civilian 
control of the military. The argument states that transitions with minimal military control 
                                                 
 38 Alfred Stepan, The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1971), 3–6; In a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime, the military govern with a coalition of 
technocrats managing governmental functions. See David Collier, “Overview of the Bureaucratic-
Authoritarian Model,” in The New Authoritarianism in Latin America, ed. David Collier (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1979), 24. 
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offer the best prospects for successful reform.39 This case study, however, argues that 
civil society is a pivotal factor in determining whether the military is able to control the 
transition. Civil society affects the outcome via protests and political participation. 
Additionally, the manner in which the preceding domestic conflict ended affects the 
degree of civil society’s participation.  
B. BACKGROUND OF POLITICAL CONFLICT AND ITS EFFECTS 
Paul Lewis traces the origins of Argentina’s political conflict to the 
implementation of universal male suffrage in 1912. The broadened electorate caused 
politicians to be susceptible to populist issues affecting the average Argentine. The 
oligarchy’s resistance toward labor demands, coupled with the woeful economic 
conditions of the Great Depression, caused instability throughout the country. On 
September 6, 1930, Lieutenant General José Félix Benito Uriburu y Uriburu became the 
de facto president after a coup d’état. Although his reign lasted only 17 months, his 
presidency began the pendulum swing between democratic and military rule that lasted 
for over fifty years. The presidency shifted from civilians to military officials at an 
alarmingly fast rate until 1946, when Juan Domingo Perón was elected president.40   
Perón rose through the army ranks during the military administrations of the 
1930s and 1940s. A skillful politician, he united the extreme right and left wings of 
Argentina’s political spectrum. As president however, he enacted laws that set the 
precedent for political repression of one’s opponents. Although adored by his followers, 
his populist agenda wreaked further havoc on the economy and caused unrest amongst 
the oligarchs. As the precedent for military intervention had already been set, Perón was 
forced into exile through a coup in 1955.41  
The intent of the coup was to restructure the economy and once again set 
Argentina on a path to prosperity, but these intentions were not enough to overcome the 
                                                 
 39 Agüero, “Institutions, Transitions, and Bargaining,” 197. Ruth Stanley supports this argument in 
“Modes of Transition v. Electoral Dynamic: Democratic Control of the Military in Argentina and Chile,” 
found in Journal of Third World Studies (Fall 2001.) 
40  Lewis, Guerrillas and Generals, 4–6. 
41 Ibid., 5–8. 
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vast resentment within the population so enamored of Perón. In an attempt to control 
dissent and prevent a Peronist restoration, the newly installed president, General Pedro 
Aramburu, outlawed Perón’s party and indefinitely banned it from participating in 
elections.
42
 Peronism proved very resilient, however, and able to win local elections 
when allowed to run. This led to further proscription for the party, and in turn to labor 
unrest, thus precipitating authoritarian rule. Further oppression occurred when students 
and university members voiced opposition to the 1966 coup that placed General Juan 
Carlos Onganía in power. On July 29, 1966, now known as the “Night of the Long 
Batons,” police stormed the universities with tear gas and began beating students and 
faculty for their vocal opposition. Domestic guerrilla groups formed and utilized violence 
to demand Perón’s return.43  
The guerrillas aimed their violent acts at public places and military officers. 
Bombings and hijackings were used to demonstrate strength to the military government, 
but their most effective means of publicizing themselves was by kidnapping 
businessmen, which often turned a tidy profit.44 Military officers were also targeted for 
kidnappings and assassinations. General Juan Carlos Sánchez was gunned down by 
guerrillas in 1971; former military president General Aramburu was captured and 
executed in a mock trial a year before.
45
 In addition, the guerrillas utilized torture 
methods used by the military throughout the 1930s, including the use of the cattle prod.
46
 
The guerrilla groups did not achieve widespread support from the population on 
their own. Instead, it was the government’s reactions to guerrilla activity that drew 
popular sympathy for the guerrillas’ cause. The military government received heavy 
criticism for the policies and methods it used to capture and punish guerrillas, most 
notably after the Trelew Massacre of 1972 where 16 top guerrilla leaders were summarily 
                                                 
 42 Lewis, Guerrillas and Generals, 4–6. 
43 Moyano, Argentina’s Lost Patrol, 18–21. 
44 Lewis, Guerrillas and Generals, 56–58. 
45 Ibid., 54, and Moyano, Argentina’s Lost Patrol, 25. 
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executed at a naval base.
47
 Public opposition to military rule forced the military to seek a 
political exit.48  
Recognizing they had lost the will of the people, the military capitulated and 
agreed to hold elections for a return to democratic rule. Perón returned to Argentina but 
was forbidden to run for office. His stand-in for the Peronist Party, Héctor Cámpora, won 
the election with 49.5 percent of the vote; 86 percent of the electorate voted.
49
 The 
guerrillas had won their objectives: Peronism was no longer illegal and their legal 
political voices had been restored. Additionally, Cámpora granted amnesty to all 
incarcerated terrorists. However, terrorists groups continued the use of violence and 
refused to accept the democratic elections.50  
Political violence increased, giving way to Cámpora’s replacement by Perón in 
September 1973, after new elections.51 Peron’s death, almost a year later, elevated his 
wife Isabel Perón to the presidency.52  She was also unable to maintain political unity or 
domestic security. On February 5, 1975, she signed a decree authorizing the army to 
begin Operación Independencia in order to stamp out the guerrilla forces in Tucumán 
province.
53
 This gave the military legal justification for conducting internal warfare and 
considering their fellow citizens as combatants. As the year progressed, and Isabel further 
lost her grip of the Argentine state and economy, the military as an institution began to 
feel justified in taking control of the government. The economy was in shambles, and 
guerrillas were publicized as an out-of-control threat. Therefore, the military removed 
Isabel from power on March 24, 1976, ushering in the final period of military rule in 20th 
                                                 
 47 The Trelew Massacre involved the execution of sixteen captured guerrillas after a failed escape 
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51 Ibid., 90. 
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century Argentina. The junta was composed of General Jorge Rafael Videla, Admiral 
Emilio Eduardo Massera, and Brigadier General Orlando Ramón Agosti.
54
 
This coincides with what Alfred Stepan has called “new professionalism of 
internal security and national development,”55 where the military’s role is expanded. In 
Argentina’s case, the military’s participation in counterterrorist and counterinsurgency 
campaigns on their domestic soil, emboldened them to take over the government, 
believing they could do better than the civilians. The military, as an institution, took over 
the federal and regional governments. Military officers filled bureaucratic positions 
within the government normally reserved for civilians, often collecting dual salaries.56 
Additionally, the military divided the country into four zones, facilitating each army 
corps a region to govern.57  
Once in power, the military played on the population’s fear. General Videla, de 
facto president and head of the military junta, had already remarked earlier in 1975, “As 
many people as necessary must die in Argentina so that the country will again be 
secure.”58 It is worth noting that even Juan Perón’s former personal representative, Jorge 
Paladino, did not consider the military takeover as a coup. He stated, “Properly speaking, 
it wasn’t a coup. The Armed Forces did nothing more than to accept the citizens’ tacit 
and/or explicit request that they intervene, take charge.”59  
In prosecuting the war against subversion after the coup, laws were enacted once 
again prohibiting political parties and eliminating the freedom to voice disagreement with 
the government.
60
 Citizens found in violation were subject to arrest, torture, and possibly 
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 Captive individuals were taken to clandestine concentration camps found 
throughout the country. Oscar González and Horacio Cid were two individuals who 
escaped from concentration camps within Argentina. In 1979, their testimony to Amnesty 
International detailed torture involving beatings, electrocutions, and rapes. The “picana” 
(cattle prod) was applied to all sensitive portions of the body, including sexual organs. 
Husbands and boyfriends were forced to watch their wives and girlfriends be raped by 
soldiers.
62
   
The military government never acknowledged the existence of camps or the 
disappearances. Family members seeking information or demanding writs of habeas 
corpus were told the government did not have the missing individual in custody. Judges 
became fearful for their own lives and occupations, and would not dare challenge 
information from the military. Also, the citizenry could not turn to the local police for 
support. Local police turned a blind eye to known actions of the military by ceasing 
patrols and creating “green zones” for military abductions, when they were not directly 
implicated in the disappearances.
63
 
The one main effective group that was able to overcome fear and take a stand 
against the military government was the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo, or Mothers of 
Plaza de Mayo. The Madres marched every Thursday in silent protest demanding 
information about their “disappeared” loved ones. Their status as defenseless women in 
public and their growing numbers improved their safety while protesting. An offshoot, 
the Abuelas, or Grandmothers, joined their protest marches as well. This proved to be an 
effective means of delivering their message to the international arena.
64
 
The Madres started the “rebirth” of Argentine civil society. Society mobilized 
around the Madres’ cause, and was emboldened to protest the crippling economic 
conditions. In addition to the Madres, the Asamblea Permanente por los Derechos 
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Humanos, or Permanent Assembly for Human Rights (ADPH), actively protested and 
beseeched the military to change its policies. The ADPH, formed in 1975, also created 
the Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales, or Center for Legal and Social Studies 
(CELS), in order to support victims’ legal proceedings against the government. In 1977, 
they publicly submitted a letter to General Videla condemning the government’s refusal 
to acknowledge habeas corpus requests.65  
The military’s policies had also led to further economic decline. In 1982, the 
military’s humiliating defeat in the Falklands/Malvinas War dissipated any remaining 
fears of the military regime. General Reynaldo Bignone became the final military 
president in June 1982, and very quickly sought an exit strategy for the military.66 
C. TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY  
Argentina’s transition to democracy in 1983 most closely followed Huntington’s 
analysis of transplacement. This category best describes the transition because, although 
society demanded a return to democratic rule, the military actually initiated the transition. 
It could be argued that the military did not have a choice after the Malvinas fiasco, and 
that a civilian uprising would have eventually overthrown the government, as there were 
almost daily civilian protests.67 Nonetheless, that did not happen. The military prepared 
for a transition and is rumored to have entered into negotiations with union-backed 
Peronists in order to procure certain prerogatives in hopes of preserving the military 
institution.68 Given that Peronism had been a central issue in Argentina’s political 
conflict and still retained high popularity, it was a reasonable conjecture that a Peronist-
affiliated candidate would win the presidential election and maintain pre-transition 
agreements.69 
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Analysis of the pre-election environment invites speculation that the prospects of 
achieving complete civilian control of the armed forces were minimal. After all, even 
though it was a quick transition process, it was not a collapse, and the military was able 
to foster favorable conditions to their stepping down. Amnesty laws were passed and the 
military largely expected to be left alone by the Peronists.70 Furthermore, for the past 
fifty years, the military had at times returned power to civilians, only to usurp it shortly 
thereafter. The rotation between civilian and military rule became an institutional norm 
following the Argentine high court’s 1930 ruling that military coups were legal because 
“they all alone have the task of protecting life, liberty, and property in the event the 
established order breaks down.”71 Democracy was by no means a sure thing. 
The turning point occurred in the presidential election of 1983. The military 
assumed the Peronists would win the election as they were the traditional populist party. 
However, both the military and the Peronist party neglected to factor in society’s anger 
toward the military junta. The victorious candidate, Raul Alfonsín, had campaigned for 
holding military officials accountable and promised to annul the amnesty law; his 
opponent had not.72 Additionally, Alfonsín had been the former vice president of the 
ADPH.73 The extensive human rights abuses produced a multitude of angry relatives 
seeking justice. One explanation for society’s anger, almost exclusively leveled at the 
military, was the absence of guerrilla violence toward the end of military rule. The 
military had successfully eliminated the two main guerrilla groups, Montoneros and the 
ERP (People’s Revolutionary Army), as serious threats to the state by 1979.74 The 
military lost influence on the incoming democracy when Alfonsín won 52 percent of the 
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vote; this was 12 percentage points higher than his competitor, Ítalo Lúder, of the 
Judicialist (Peronist) Party.75 
D. PURSUIT OF CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY 
President Alfonsín entered the office with the odds seemingly against him. He 
inherited an economy in a downward spiral, a military embarrassed by their abysmal 
performance at war, and a society determined to see justice through. From the start, in 
order to govern, Alfonsín had to take two positions unfavorable to the military. One 
(budget cuts) was forced upon him because of the status of the economy. The other, 
military trials were part of his campaign pledges. The military found the budgets cuts 
disparaging as it sought to recover war losses and continue to pay members of the armed 
forces. Military members saw their salaries cut and readiness ability shattered.76  
Adding insult to injury, Alfonsín directed a commission to retrieve evidence of 
human rights violations and to account for the victims lost from 1976 to 1983. The report, 
entitled Nunca Mas (Never Again), detailed horrendous accusations of military abuse.77 
As Alfonsín won the election based on his promises to bring those accountable to justice, 
he directed the military courts to hold trials for the first three military juntas. The military 
refused to levy charges, ultimately leading to trials in the civilian courts.78 The military 
institution did not overtly challenge the trials and verdicts, as the accused were retired 
military officers. The circumstances changed, however, when judges surpassed 
Alfonsín’s original intentions and ordered trials for lower-ranking officers and their 
subordinates.79  
Scholarly debate surrounds the determination of which method of implementing 
reforms offers the best chance of consolidation and military subordination. It could be 
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argued that Alfonsín’s election and subsequent human rights trials plagued Argentina 
with uncertainty and placed its transition at risk of failure. Looking at the short-term 
implications, that argument would appear correct. Alfonsín endured three military 
rebellions that consolidated into the group called the Carapintadas.80 One occurred in 
1987, and the other two occurred in January and December of 1988. His successor, 
Carlos Menem, endured a final rebellion in 1990.81 One can certainly make the argument 
that a non-confrontational strategy with the military would have likely resulted in fewer, 
if any, rebellions. A counter question asks, “If there was never such a pointed conflict 
between the government and the military, how would the government ever fully exert 
authority over the military?” This does not serve to make light of the dangers in 
confronting the military, but it does imply that until the government fully and publicly 
asserts its superiority over the military, civilian control will remain in doubt. Again, the 
military had given up power before, only to take it back shortly thereafter. After the 1983 
transition, Alfonsín’s steadfastness and society’s resilience were able to overcome the 
military’s protesting about loss of their prerogatives. The guilty verdicts remained, and 
Alfonsín continued his push toward civil-military relations reform. 
The military rebellions publicly demonstrated a lack of complete civilian control 
of the military, even though Alfonsín had implemented widespread reform. Among those 
reforms, he included a civilian defense minister, demoted the top military officers to 
“chief of staff” positions, slashed the budget, and placed a civilian in charge of 
Argentina’s nuclear commission for the first time since its inception. Additionally, 
Alfonsín fostered the passage of the National Defense Law, thereby preventing the 
military from conducting internal security missions.82  
The military resented all the reforms, but the one it contested most was the 
ongoing trials. Even though the military rebelled and received concessions in order to 
induce them to return to the barracks, holding the trials was not necessarily the wrong 
thing to do, as Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri suggest. The trials occurred because 
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most Argentines demanded it; they demanded it with their vote for Alfonsín. Society did 
not back down even in the face of military rebellions. At the height of the rebellions, 
society mobilized, demonstrating their intolerance for another military coup.83 Society’s 
demand for democracy fostered a long-term implication: democracy was there to stay. 
This corresponds with Harold Trinkunas’ statement that civil-military issues will only 
become major political issues when society actively protests past human rights abuses.84 
Manuel Garretón states that after a military government that produced intense fear 
throughout the country relinquishes power, the military as an institution must be subdued 
so that it can no longer threaten the peace and mind of its citizens.85 The problem centers 
on what to do with the military and how best to control it. Unless the military is 
completely dissolved, a thoughtful decision must be made as to what its new mission will 
be. In Argentina, the lack of a mission—after being barred from internal defense, coupled 
with the trials and reduced budgets—created discontent within the ranks.  
Alfonsín failed to provide the military with redirection and his foreign policy 
created conditions diminishing the need for a military. Shortly after his inauguration, he 
guided Argentina to formally end the Beagle Conflict with Chile.86 His successor, 
President Carlos Menem, completed his pursuit. Additionally, Alfonsín embarked on a 
policy of rapprochement with Brazil. After 1985, when Brazil transitioned to democracy, 
Alfonsín found a workable partner in the restoration and improvement of Argentine–
Brazilian relations.87  
Argentine relations with its neighbors continued to improve under Menem. A 
bilateral nuclear treaty with Brazil expanded the nuclear-weapons-free zone in Latin 
America and enlarged the international membership of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
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Treaty (NPT).88 All of these peaceful initiatives toward Argentina’s neighbors created a 
conflict-free zone. As the military is expected to be a master of conflict, there arguably is 
not much for it to do when there are no perceived threats externally and it is forbidden 
from conducting internal security. 
While Alfonsín never garnered the loyalty of the armed forces, his presidency was 
never nominally threatened by the military. The rebelling forces always stated that it was 
not their intention to overthrow the government; they desired to restore honor and 
stability to the military institution by purging high-ranking officers and stopping the 
prosecutions of military members.89 Alfonsín persuaded the Congress to pass the “Due 
Obedience Law” that absolved all members below the rank of colonel of any 
wrongdoing, but this did not change the democratic course in Argentina.90 Argentina held 
its second presidential election in 1989, resulting in the presidency transferring to Carlos 
Menem. Since 1928, this was the first time political power transferred peacefully between 
members of opposing parties.91  
Upon taking office, Carlos Menem faced a disgruntled military. They had no 
mission, reduced pay, and humiliation from their past attempt at government. Again, even 
though they were disgruntled and conducted rebellions, their stated goals were not to take 
over the government. Menem did not have the ability to raise their salary or budget due to 
persistent economic woes, but he did pursue a policy of amnesty for all convicted and 
accused service members. Menem’s popularity fell to its lowest numbers, however, as 
Argentine citizens were angry at the amnesty.
92
 Judging by the reaction from the enraged 
electorate, it would have been foolhardy for the military to even think of usurping power. 
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The military had the resources to forcefully assume power, but it could not put down an 
entire population rebelling against military rule.  
Even though Menem’s popularity dipped to its lowest levels, his concession was 
enough to achieve subjective control over the military. Military leaders, grateful for the 
amnesty pledge, sided with Menem during the last rebellion, leading to its abysmal 
failure.93 Once Menem garnered some support from within the military, he then cleverly 
sought out a positive mission for the services. Menem, with the approval of Congress, 
sent Argentine forces to support coalition efforts in the first Gulf War. Following war 
operations, the Argentine military became a large contributor to United Nations (UN) 
peace efforts. Supporting UN operations provided additional salary, equipment, and 
prestige for the Argentine military at no extra expense to the country’s budget. Instead, 
the international community financed the rebirth of the Argentine military, due to its 
large donations to peacekeeping around the world.94  
In addition to providing the military with redirection, peacekeeping helped 
finalize civilian control of the military in Argentina. Arturo Sotomayor states in his book, 
The Myth of the Democratic Peacekeeper: Civil Military Relations and the United 
Nations, that President Menem “used peacekeeping as a carrot and stick with which to 
induce change.”95 By enticing junior officers with better wages and upward mobility, the 
military accepted its newfound occupation. The financial incentives of peacekeeping 
operations supported the junior officers and non-commissioned officers from which the 
Carapintadas originated.96 In order to adequately prepare Argentine forces for 
peacekeeping operations, the defense ministry organized training and doctrinal 
development, thereby implementing civilian influence over the military’s development.97 
Finally, the Argentine forces that were sent abroad had the fortune of serving alongside 
militaries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO.) This exposed Argentine 
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service members to professional Western militaries, whereby they saw, first hand, the 
actions of professional militaries committed to democracy and civilian leadership.98 
The epitome of Argentina’s military reform can be seen by examining its conduct 
during the financial crises at the turn of the century. The military’s 2001 refusal to carry 
out unconstitutional orders of subsequent President Fernando De la Rúa (1999–2001), to 
put down civilian protesters, demonstrates the military’s commitment to democracy and 
its withdrawal from political affairs. Having remembered society’s anger for past human 





Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri cite Menem’s strategy as evidence of the 
negative implications of trials and the positive implications of a non-confrontational 
strategy toward the armed forces. It is true that civil-military relations did not take a 
dramatic turn for the better until after amnesty was granted. However, their approach 
deals with how to achieve subjective control over the armed services. Relying exclusively 
on this strategy ignores the historical trends in Argentina. Since 1930, the government 
had constantly shifted hands between civilians and the military. The transition to 
democracy in 1983 was not the first time Argentina attempted to restrain military 
political power. Argentines had grown quite accustomed to the military swooping into 
power and replacing elected political leaders; at times, society even welcomed the 
military intervention. The 1976–1983 government, however, was different. Society’s 
demand for the restoration of democracy and for accountability for human rights 
violations turned the 1983 election into a watershed event. No, the election did not solve 
relations between the military and civilian government, but it sent a strong message that 
society would no longer tolerate military governments.  
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In transitioning to democracy, Argentina achieved favorable conditions to induce 
democratic civilian control of the military, primarily because of domestic pressure from 
Argentine society. It is Argentine society that challenged the military’s authority, starting 
with the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo. It is also Argentine society that refused to elect a 
Peronist candidate rumored to be backed by the unions and military, and instead elected 
into office a Radical (of the Radical Civic Union) determined to bring justice to violators. 
This ensured a transition free of military intervention. Full civilian control was not 
achieved overnight, but the principle of democracy was. The direct confrontation of the 
Alfonsín administration with the military, and the people’s supportive demonstrations, 
certified that principle. Over time, with clever redirection on behalf of Carlos Menem, the 
military found a new honorable role in society, where they are regarded for their 
peacekeeping efforts. In their new role, complete submission to the constitutional order 
became institutionalized. Today, the Argentine military remains under civilian control. A 
civilian defense minister coordinates all military activity, and the Argentine Congress 
determines budgets. Furthermore, as of 2003, Argentina has once again reversed its 
amnesty policy;100 there is no sign of a military rebellion to come. 
Some may agree with the premise that direct confrontation with the armed forces 
is best avoided. Scholars can point to other former military regimes in the Southern Cone 
where trials either failed to be held in a timely manner, or failed to be held at all. 
However, it is worth noting that Argentina was the first within the Southern Cone of 
South America to transition, thereby setting a standard of expectations for others. The 
Argentine military’s lack of domestic influence enabled the new government to 
implement widespread reforms quickly. In Brazil and Chile, the military possessed a 
greater rapport with their respective societies, and thereby succeeded in implementing 
safeguards. The Brazilian military did not come under a civilian defense minister until 
1999, even though democracy had been restored much earlier.101 In Chile, General 
Augusto Pinochet remained a central leader of the armed forces and a central figure in 
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government until his death in 2006. The Argentine military did not have such a unifying 
figure. Pinochet’s 1980 constitution remained in effect, guaranteeing his great influence 
in Chile’s government. Even though Chile transitioned to democracy because a majority 
of Chileans voted not to extend Pinochet’s plebiscite, 44 percent of the electorate desired 
to keep the dictatorship in place.102  
Therefore, the argument remains valid that societal demands are a key to 
implementing civilian control of the military. Society’s role in electing a government that 
holds deep commitment to civil-military reform cannot be overlooked. Argentines 
prevented the military from controlling the mode of transition with their active 
participation in elections, thereby allowing a civilian government to assert its authority. 
Finally, President Menem’s policies created conditions leading to the achievement of 
civilian control by redirecting the armed forces and providing them with a noble purpose 
and mission. 
 
                                                 




A. INTRODUCTION   
Guatemala’s 1985 transition to democracy has produced continuous democratic 
rule for nearly three decades. However, its movement toward democratic consolidation 
and the establishment of civilian control over its armed forces has been minimal 
compared to that of Argentina. This is due to the fact that, as this chapter shows, civil 
society did not play the vital role in Guatemala that it played in Argentina. Having briefly 
established democratic rule in 1944, Guatemala succumbed to numerous periods of 
military rule between 1954 and 1985 because of political instability and foreign 
influence. The political turmoil fostered a 36-year civil war, beginning in 1960 and 
ending in 1996. The military’s conduct during the war and the war’s lasting presence 
overshadowed the 1985 transition, resulting in little movement toward democratic 
consolidation and civil-military relations reform. The voices of the people, silenced by 
repression and ethnic divisions, did not influence greater reform. 
Like Argentina, the Guatemalan case study validates the mode-of-transition 
argument, which states that the method of transition deeply affects democratic 
consolidation and civilian control of the military. The argument states that transitions 
with minimal military control offer the best prospect for successful reform.103 Guatemala 
presents the negative consequences whenever the transition is under military control. This 
case study also supports the argument that civil society’s actions are a pivotal factor in 
determining the military’s ability to control the transition, via its active protest against the 
regime and its participation in the electoral process, or lack thereof. In Guatemala’s case, 
civil society participated in politics early on during the 1985 transition, but over time, its 
participation dwindled. Additionally, the ongoing civil war prevented society from freely 
voicing dissent toward the government out of fear of violent reprisals.  
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B. BACKGROUND OF POLITICAL CONFLICT AND ITS EFFECTS 
Guatemala’s political conflict began in 1944 with society’s demand for 
democracy. In that year, General Jorge Ubico y Castañeda, who had been the ruling 
dictator since 1931, was forced to resign in July, having failed to silence society’s public 
demonstrations protesting his labor and economic policies.104 Ubico’s policies enraged 
Guatemalans because of the manner in which he sought foreign capital. He allowed 
foreign companies free reign within the country, and permitted the foreign ownership of 
vast tracts of Guatemalan land. At the time of his departure, only 2 percent of the 
population controlled 72 percent of the land, and a sizable portion of the arable land 
remained unutilized.
105
 New Orleans-based United Fruit Company was the major foreign 
investor; it owned the largest banana plantation, the only railroad, and the telephone 
services.
106
 Additionally, Ubico’s labor law, passed in 1934, prevented impoverished 
Guatemalans from obtaining any upward mobility. All landless individuals were required 
to work a minimum of 150 days a year for plantation owners. This not only affected the 
large indigenous population, but also any impoverished Ladinos, or persons of mixed 
European and native descent, who were also landless.
107
  
Upon Ubico’s resignation, he appointed Federico Ponce as provisional president. 
Even though Ponce raised teachers’ salaries and announced that democratic elections 
would soon be held, he could not calm the masses in Guatemala.108 He increased political 
surveillance, and denied Guatemalans the right to private assembly and public 
demonstrations.109 Ponce’s political opponents centered their hopes on a former 
schoolteacher, Dr. Juan José Arévalo, who had been in exile, living in Argentina.110 Even 
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though he had not been present for previous demonstrations, Guatemalans 
enthusiastically welcomed him when he arrived in Guatemala on September 2, 1944.111 
However, he quickly went into hiding because Ponce ordered his arrest.112 Ponce’s 
actions prompted two army officers, Major Francisco Arana and Captain Jacobo Árbenz, 
to conduct a military revolt, labeled the “October Revolution,” which forced Ponce to 
leave office.113 The two-man junta held elections shortly thereafter and supported the 
candidacy of Arévalo. Arévalo won the presidential election of 1944 in a landslide with 
85 percent of the eligible vote, and was inaugurated on March 15, 1945.
114
  
Once Arévalo took office in 1945, he sought to address social grievances and 
better the conditions of the average Guatemalan. In 1949, Congress passed the Law of 
Forced Rental, which was intended to allow Guatemalans to rent unused land from 
plantation owners.115 He continued his push for social change until the end of his six-year 
term. In 1950, then Colonel Árbenz, who had served as Arévalo’s Minister of Defense, 
was elected president and inaugurated the following March, marking the first peaceful 
transition of power between presidents in 20th century Guatemala.116 Árbenz pursued a 
strategy of competing with United Fruit by building a national railway and creating a 
second port facility free of foreign influence.117  His policy goals drew the ire of United 
Fruit because they would infringe upon their profits and control over Guatemalan affairs. 
He also built on his predecessor’s work; his infamous Decree 900 demanded that unused 
plantation land be confiscated at cost and then turned over to landless individuals for a 
rental fee.118 The United States, however, with possible prodding from United Fruit, 
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determined this to be a communist action worthy of U.S. intervention. In 1954, the CIA 
removed Árbenz from power by sponsoring a popular revolt.119  
The United States’ intervention further compounded Guatemala’s struggle for 
democratic stability. In 1957, Carlos Castillo Armas, America’s handpicked successor to 
Árbenz, was assassinated, giving way to a short-lived military junta. After the junta, 
Guillermo Flores became the provisional president until March 1958, when General José 
Miguel Ramón Ydígoras Fuentes assumed the presidency after achieving a weak 
electoral victory.120 His foreign policy choices created divisions within the armed forces, 
leading to further instability within the country. Ydígoras allowed the CIA to use 
Guatemala as a staging base for the failed Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. Several of his 
officers, already discontented with the economic conditions and levels of corruption in 
the government, became angered at the use of Guatemalan soil to topple another 
government. In November 1960, claiming that Ydígoras permitted a loss of sovereignty, 
several junior officers and approximately a third of the army began an unsuccessful 
rebellion to topple the government that marked the beginning of civil war.121 
Guatemala deteriorated rapidly after the onset of war. The United States poured 
enormous amounts of financial and military aid into this endeavor, seeking to squash any 
perceived communist developments in the Western Hemisphere. Having failed to prevent 
the Cuban Revolution and fearful of a communist state between itself and the Panama 
Canal, the United States dispatched Special Forces to train the Guatemalan army.122 In 
1966, however, the United States increased military aid to include bomber planes, 
napalm, and radar detection devices, because the Guatemalan Army could not contain the 
rising guerrilla movement.123 Additionally in 1966, then President Julio César Méndez 
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Montenegro, who had only received a plural victory during the presidential election (44 
percent of the vote),124 signed an agreement with the Guatemalan Army, granting them 
complete autonomy to pursue internal security matters.125 This action formalized the 
military’s autonomy from civilian rule and greatly hurt future reform attempts following 
the transition to democracy. 
The army’s military capabilities surpassed those of the guerrillas even before the 
increased military aid. The military could not contain the guerrilla movement because it 
took refuge in the highlands as early as 1962. This resulted in the fighting being brought 
to the indigenous population’s homesteads.126 Once the fighting enveloped the highlands, 
the indigenous population began to suffer numerous casualties. The ability of guerrillas to 
hide amongst the highland population led to the natives being labeled as the “water” 
supporting the guerrilla “fish.”127 The indigenous people became trapped in the middle, 
as the army punished them for supporting the guerrillas, and the guerrillas punished any 
person whom they suspected of supporting the army. The cycle of violence continued to 
escalate, with neither side able to eliminate their opponents.  
As the war entered its third decade, the Guatemalan army exacerbated the war’s 
effects by forming the Civilian Self-Defense Patrols in 1981.128 The army forced 
individuals to join the patrols by threatening them and their families.129 These members 
were then required to patrol villages ahead of the army, and often committed atrocities in 
their own communities.130 Thus, the army not only committed human rights violations, 
but also succeeded in turning Guatemalans against each other, further preventing any 
attempt at a united societal uprising. The bloodshed was on everyone’s hands. Human 
rights violations soared with babies being cut out of wombs; women were brutally raped 
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and murdered. Women and children were often hacked to death by machetes in a ruthless 
attempt to squash any notion of rebellion.131 
The pendulum swing of the presidency between military dictators and military 
elected presidents continued until the final set of dictatorships began in 1982. General 
José Efraín Ríos Montt conducted a coup, beginning a 17-month dictatorship. As a 
fervent believer in the “fish and water” concept, Ríos Montt launched a military strategy 
labeled the “scorched earth” campaign.132 During that time, the war turned genocidal, 
with the army attempting to eliminate entire ethnic tribes. Faced with enormous military 
defeats, the multitudes of guerrilla organizations decided to band together and form the 
Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) in 1982.133 
 Ironically, however, once coming to power, Ríos Montt announced a plan toward 
democracy, set to take place in 1985.134 This earned him the favor of U.S. President 
Ronald Regan who stated Ríos Montt had received “a bum rap.”135 Additionally, the U.S. 
State Department claimed that Ríos Montt’s coup had “improved the human rights 
situation and has opened the way for a more effective counterinsurgency.”136 Ríos 
Montt’s dictatorship ended shortly thereafter by a follow-on coup; his successor, Óscar 
Humberto Mejía Victores, continued toward democratization.137 While on the surface 
appearing as a noble military institution seeking to establish stability and democratic rule, 
the military’s motives were not as pure as they seemed. The international community had 
blacklisted Guatemala for its atrocious human rights violations. Foreign capital had 
significantly reduced, and Guatemala’s long-time partner, the United States, had 
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publically condemned it under the previous James E. Carter administration for human 
rights violations.138 As business elites became more irate with the military government, 
the military sought an exit strategy that would preserve its institutional autonomy. 
C. TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY 
Guatemala’s transition to democracy in 1985 most closely followed Huntington’s 
analysis of transformation. This category best describes the transition because it was the 
military, under the leadership of Mejía Victores, which initiated and controlled the 
transition. In 1984, Guatemala held congressional elections. The newly elected Congress 
worked toward drafting a new constitution for Guatemala in order to establish 
presidential elections in 1985. The elections were generally considered “free and fair,” 
with the exception that no political party associated with the guerrillas was permitted to 
run for office.139 An astonishing 70 percent of eligible Guatemalans voted in the first 
round of the presidential election. Participation dropped to 65 percent during the second 
round, which certified Marco Vinicio Cerezo Arévalo as the first civilian president of 
Guatemala since Méndez Montenegro left office in 1970.140  
While this was an enormous step toward Guatemala’s democratization, the 
country remained in an intense internal struggle with a military autonomous from civilian 
rule. President Cerezo, after his election, even openly admitted his inferiority toward the 
military in terms of political power.141 As the military had been the only continuous 
institution of government since the 1954 coup, it remained the strongest entity within the 
country, leaving it responsible for tending to most of Guatemala’s struggles. Moreover, 
the military’s strength and unchecked independence allowed it to remain a threat toward 
democratic consolidation. President Cerezo survived two coup attempts, one in May 1988 
and the other in May 1989, only because his Minister of Defense was able to counter the 
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coups with loyalist troops.142 The military also remained committed to the appearance of 
democracy when they removed President Jorge Serrano Elías from office in 1993 and 
forced him into exile. President Serrano had experienced earlier trouble with the military 
after he recognized Belize in 1991. At that time, the military still regarded all of Belize as 
belonging to Guatemala.143 Although a coup is non-democratic by nature, Serrano had 
attempted to dissolve the Congress and suspend the constitution. Therefore, the military 
removed him until new elections could be held.144 
In addition to reestablishing democratic rule, the Guatemalan government, in 
accordance with the 1985 constitution, permitted the creation of the Procuraduría de los 
Derechos Humanos (PDH)145 The PDH’s purpose was to document human rights abuses 
in order to promote their reduction and eventual extinction. While publicly supporting the 
commission and denouncing brutal atrocities, the government took measures to hinder 
meaningful revelations from coming forward. Often times, commission workers did not 
speak the language of the indigenous people, thereby denying them a forum to tell their 
story.146 
The civil war continued throughout the 1990s, resulting in continual international 
pressure mounting up against the Guatemalan government, especially from the unwanted 
attention that human rights atrocities garnered.147 The United Nations Commission on 
Human Rights indicated that it would place Guatemala on the list of “gross human rights 
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violators” if President Serrano did not initiate peace negotiations.148 Additionally, the UN 
sponsored the “Group of Friends,” comprised of six international governments pushing 
the Guatemalan government toward peace.149 
Even without societal influence, the army, unable to completely annihilate the 
guerrillas, came to the realization that negotiations were the only viable means of ending 
the war. The first negotiations took placed under President Serrano in 1991. However, the 
1993 attempted self-coup of Serrano placed negotiations on hold.150 Negotiations finally 
resumed after the slim second-round election victory of President Álvaro Arzú in January 
1996.  He campaigned on a promise to gain control of the military and successfully end 
the peace process before the end of the year.151 As president-elect, he met with the 
UNRG to discuss how best to conclude the civil war. His persistence led to the signing of 
the peace accords on December 29, 1996.152 At the war’s conclusion, over 200,000 
people had died.153 
D. PURSUIT OF CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY 
Even though the war had ended, the horrific consequences had not.  The social 
issues present before the war began, remained after its conclusion.  The vast majority of 
Guatemalans remained in poverty and many were illiterate, with almost all of the 
indigenous population falling into that category. However, the war’s ending promised 
better governing of Guatemala and positive reform in civil-military relations. The agreed-
upon accords called for the civilianization of the intelligence agency, the reorganization 
of the police force, the reduction in the size of the military and its budget, and the 
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focusing of the military only on external defense.154 Additionally, the military was to 
become subject to civilian courts for common crimes. However, partial amnesty was 
granted for crimes committed before 1996, excluding genocide, torture, and forced 
disappearances. This resulted in de facto amnesty because the established truth 
commission did not have judicial power assigned to it.155  
President Arzú did achieve some of the required reforms. He asserted civilian 
supremacy over military promotions by purging several generals due to corruption 
scandals. Additionally, the military shrank in size and saw its budget reduced from 0.99 
percent of the GDP to 0.68 percent. Finally, he dismantled the last remaining civil 
patrols. His achievements did not fulfill the goal of establishing civilian supremacy over 
the military. Although he created a Strategic Analysis Secretariat (SAE) as a civilian 
intelligence agency, intelligence gathering remained concentrated in military hands. 
Mostly military personnel, although intended to be made up of civilians, staffed the SAE. 
Furthermore, Arzú failed to dismantle the Presidential General Staff (EMP), the military 
security detail that had the worst record on human rights.
156
  
As far as police reform was concerned, Arzú’s government had the ambitious task 
of creating a national police force in the hopes of removing the military from internal 
security. The buildup of the police force proved to be very challenging as there were very 
few readily trained individuals. After the peace accords, police presence was lacking in 
approximately 60 percent of all Guatemalan municipalities.157 In seeking police recruits, 
the government permitted unemployed servicemen (from military downsizing) to apply. 
Former military men made up 7 percent of the police force and thereby performed the 
same mission they had done in the army; they just wore different uniforms.158 While this 
strategy helps ease the pain of military downsizing, looking below the surface, one can 
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see potential problems. The very same individuals who had committed human rights 
violations in the name of internal security remained in the exact same position with 
similar power. As Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan claim, citizens must have trust in the 
government for consolidation to occur.159 The people of Guatemala lived in fear of the 
military for 36 years because of the military’s violent and brutal means of conducting 
police roles. A small uniform change does little to reduce a population’s long-term fear of 
brutality. 
Arzú had another opportunity to promote additional lasting reform, but failed to 
promote it, and interference from the Congress prevented it from taking root. Two 
proposed referenda to change the constitution would have formally redefined the 
military’s mission to external defense, and permitted a civilian to fulfill the role of 
defense minister.160 The former would have guarded Guatemala from a potential 
repeating of history, and the latter would have strengthened civilian control over the 
military. Unfortunately, when the public referenda were put to a vote, only 19 percent of 
the electorate voted; the referenda failed to receive a majority vote.161 It remains an 
enigma why a population so brutally oppressed by its military would not vote in favor of 
eliminating internal security from the military’s mission. Possible reasons include: 
unenthusiastic campaigning on behalf of the Arzú administration, congressional 
scheduling issues, and a better-financed “no” campaign.162 Arzú’s lack of campaigning 
may have stemmed from his shifting focus from campaign issues to a concern over rising 
crime and economic troubles.163 
Arzú did, however, permit the establishment of a truth commission, which later 
produced a report entitled “Guatemala Never Again.” The commission compiled victims’ 
accounts of their sufferings. Although, there was never any official interference on the 
military’s part, anonymous phone calls were made to intimidate the population as they 
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prepared to testify. Daniel Wilkinson, an American human rights activist who conducted 
lengthy field research in Guatemala in the mid-1990s, recalled one such phone call 
threatening to bomb a commission meeting site that he was to attend.164  
The commission’s published report implicated the army and guerrillas in the 
ruthless killing; but it blamed the military for 90 percent of the atrocities.165 If the report 
was meant to instill credibility and trust in the Guatemalan government, it failed terribly 
due to being overshadowed by events two days after its release. Bishop Juan Gerardi 
Conedera, the lead architect of the investigation and final report of “Guatemala Never 
Again,” was murdered in the garage of his local parish.166 Francisco Goldman shares his 
investigative reporting on the murder in his book The Art of Political Murder: Who Killed 
the Bishop? The book traces responsibility to two army officers who were later 
convicted. The implication of this incident for democratic consolidation and civilian 
control of the military is grave. Although at the present time it remains impossible to 
certify that the military as an institution ordered the bishop’s death, the fact that a senior 
colonel was involved and convicted in 2002 alludes to the possibility of military 
culpability.167 Goldman’s book also offers testimony accusing current Guatemalan 
President Otto Perez Molina, at that time an active military officer, of being within the 
vicinity of the parish during Gerardi’s murder.168 This remains to be proven, but even the 
notion that a sitting president may have been an accomplice to a murder is unsettling in 
any democracy. 
Alfonso Antonio Portillo Cabrera succeeded Arzú in 2000. Sadly, he completed 
only one significant achievement in terms of civil-military relations reform, but also 
undermined many of the previous achievements. He fulfilled his campaign promise of 
dissolving the EMP; in its place, he established the Secretariat of Administrative Affairs 
and Security (SAAS.) Unfortunately, this new agency was mostly staffed with former 
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members of the EMP; thus, only a uniform change was accomplished.169 He did maintain 
his supremacy over military affairs, but only by fostering subjective—rather than 
objective—control. As a member of the Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG) Party, 
Portillo used his power to oversee military promotions to politicize the military. Only 
members loyal to the FRG party received promotions.170 The head of the FRG party, 
former dictator Ríos Montt, became a close confidant of Portillo. Ríos Montt’s influence 
over Portillo and over the FRG-controlled Congress ensured that no further reform 
occurred. Instead, the military’s budget increased along with their role in internal 
security. The rise in crime and drug trafficking provided their justification for having the 
military support police missions.171 
Little has changed in the realm of civil-military relations in Guatemala since 
Portillo left office in 2004. The military has not conducted a coup and does not appear 
prone to do so; however, the military remains insulated. Although the Congress has some 
involvement in determining the military budget, generals often refuse to offer testimony 
on the details of how the budget is appropriated on the grounds of national security. 
Article 30 of Guatemala’s constitution permits this.172 In addition, according to 
Guatemala’s Ministry of Defense website, a military general continues to fill the role of 
defense minister. The military still conducts internal security missions. These have 
increased due to continual rising crime and drug trafficking, resulting in the buildup of 
the armed forces.173  
Furthermore, there is lack of trust in the government and its abilities. Guatemala 
continues to be a dangerous place, with a homicide rate of 34.5 per every 100,000 as of 
2012, according to the U.S. Department of State. The criminal justice system is seen as 
highly inefficient, leading many Guatemalans to take justice into their own hands. 
                                                 
169 Ruhl, “The Guatemalan Military since the Peace Accords,” 70. 
170 Ibid., 69. 
171 Ibid., 71. 
172 Ibid., 76. 
173 Ruhl, “Guatemala: A Failing State?" 9. 
 42 
Lynching of accused criminals is not uncommon.
174
 Other obstacles for Guatemala 
include the present drug trade. Drugs continue to flow through Guatemala en route to the 
United States, and their cash profits have been used in political campaigns.
175
 As drug 
cartels are notoriously violent, many Guatemalans remain in a constant state of fear. This 
has caused the ironic situation where many consider the army to be the lesser evil, and 
subsequently many desire an army presence in their villages. The conditions remain so 
deteriorated that as of a 2010 Latinobarómetro poll, 58.3 percent of those answering the 
survey stated they would favor a military government.
176
 
There also remains the obstacle of little accountability for the military’s actions 
prior to the peace accords, although progress has occurred. The Guatemalan 
Constitutional Court ruled that individuals accused of forced disappearances could stand 
trial. Felipe Cusanero Coj, a former civilian army collaborator, received the first 
conviction in 2009, resulting in a sentence of 150 years.177 Additionally, in 2012, eight 
former soldiers received guilty verdicts for similar crimes resulting in sentences between 
6,000 and 8,000 years.178 Finally, courageous attorneys took an unprecedented step in 
2013 by bringing former dictator Ríos Montt to trial for crimes of genocide. In May, Ríos 
Montt received a guilty verdict and was sentenced to 80 years in prison. Shortly 
thereafter, the courts overturned the verdict on a technicality and ordered a retrial for 
2015. Guatemalans will have to wait and see if he will pay for his actions.
179
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Guatemala has had a long and turbulent history. The fractured society succumbed 
to interventionist attitudes during the Cold War and was thrust into a 36-year civil war. 
Class divisions, oppressive brutal military control, and now the ever-growing drug 
problems have rendered the Guatemalan society unable to decide its own course. The 
military remains almost completely autonomous from civilian rule and corruption rages 
throughout all parts of the government. Civil society is weak and was unable to demand 
change, thus leaving the military and corrupt officials to decide their fates for them. 
Despite some protests and social movements, the military’s violent crackdown in the 
1980s significantly silenced the voice of the Guatemalan people.180 
In reviewing Guatemala’s pursuit of democratic consolidation and civilian control 
of the military, Felipe Agüero’s predictive theory, stating that a military able to control 
the transition will minimize civilian control, is validated.181 Guatemala’s transition, as 
opposed to Argentina’s, assured them the ability to control the process. Since the 
military’s power was not threatened, the institution applied very little contestation toward 
the new government.  
Democracy is not consolidated, because the population does not have a significant 
voice through the current political parties. Wendy Hunter, in her evaluation of the 
Southern Cone region of South America, explains that reform occurs via the electoral 
process. She argues that politicians seeking election will eventually become beholden to 
the electorate and not to the military institution.
182
 It seems to be a valid argument, yet it 
does not apply to Guatemala for two reasons: 1) the party system is weak, with a very 
high electoral volatility;
183
 2) voter turnout is low, resulting in very few political parties 
taking up social issues.
184
 After the impressive 70 percent voter turnout in the first round 
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of 1985’s presidential election, voter turnout fell to as low as 36 percent in 1995.185 The 
Guatemalan citizenry has not until recently actively participated in elections. Voter 
turnout increased to nearly 61 percent in the 2011 presidential election.186  
There are some promising signs, specifically in the courts, where some war trials 
are being held. However, the government still struggles to provide security and justice, 
leaving strong support for a military government. Fortunately, the military appears 
content with the status quo for now. 
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IV. CONCLUDING COMPARISONS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
After reviewing the Argentine and Guatemalan case studies, comparisons and 
contrasts can be drawn to explain why a country democratizes effectively and why 
militaries do or do not subordinate themselves to civilian rule. Although neither example 
presents an ideal transition—whereby the military willingly relinquishes power without 
preconditions—examining the two countries’ pasts reveals that Argentina had conditions 
more conducive to consolidation than Guatemala did. Argentina’s military left power 
under humiliating circumstances and civil society actively participated in the political 
process, whereas this did not happen in Guatemala.  An explanation of these events can 
be drawn by studying three time periods: the pre-conflict environment, the transition 
period, and the post-transition period.  
B. THE PRE-CONFLICT ENVIRONMENTS 
1. Pre-Conflict Environment in Argentina 
Argentina established democratic rule in 1853 and maintained it until the 1930s, 
thereby creating a democratic history. Even though the military conducted coups 
frequently from the 1930s to the 1970s, the inner workings of the government 
experienced little change. The first coups resulted in temporary military rule with 
relatively quick handovers to democratic leadership, which kept the memory of 
democracy alive.187 The two final periods of military rule continued considerably longer; 
however, the junta kept technocrats in place and did not change government institutions. 
The government remained under military supremacy, but a large civil-service workforce 
still supported it, which enabled Argentines to maintain interaction with the 
government.188 Furthermore, Argentina never abolished its 1853 constitution, although 
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some changes were made. Therefore, when the military junta capitulated for the final 
time, a formalized governmental structure existed for post-transition efficiency.  
2. Pre-Conflict Environment in Guatemala 
Guatemala never established long-term democratic rule before its struggles began. 
Military officers dominated politics until the 1944 election of Dr. Juan José Arévalo.189 
Once the peaceful transition of power occurred in 1951, Guatemala may well have been 
on its way toward democratic consolidation, but the United States perception of 
communist activity, and the CIA’s actions, abruptly halted the process. The constant 
instability prevented the country from formalizing any governmental institutions, other 
than the military. In the midst of political instability, Guatemala lacked an inclusive 
identity. The indigenous population made up a significant portion of its citizenry, but 
faced the harshest labor and living conditions.190 
C. THE TRANSITION PERIOD  
1. Transition in Argentina 
Argentina’s conflict began as an ideological struggle and remained so throughout 
its duration. It began with Perón’s exile, and then morphed into guerilla war. As the 
guerrillas strengthened, the subversive threat provided the military with an excuse to 
institute repression and torture. The junta prosecuted the Dirty War indiscriminately. 
Anybody who dared to speak out against the government placed themselves at risk of 
torture and oftentimes death; no one was safe. 
As the Dirty War progressed, the two guerrilla organizations, the Montoneros and 
the ERP, faced tremendous losses and finally ceased to exist as functioning entities. Once 
the guerrilla threat had been eliminated, the conflict began to lose its legitimacy with 
society. The military’s overuse of torture, combined with its dismal economic and 
wartime performance during the Falklands/Malvinas War, caused it to lose legitimacy, 
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resulting in its quick exit in 1983. Additionally, prior to the transition, civil society had 
experienced a rebirth, especially through the increasing number of participants in public 
demonstrations. By quickly retreating from governance, the military did not possess the 
means to control the transition process. As the mode-of-transition argument states, the 
military’s ability to control the transition greatly affects the prospects of gaining civilian 
control over it.  
2. Transition in Guatemala 
Guatemala’s civil war began in 1960 as an ideological struggle as well, but then 
adopted qualities of ethnic strife and genocide. It also started with direct foreign 
involvement by the United States. The guerrillas retreated into the indigenous populated 
highlands in the 1960s, creating an ethnic component to the struggle, specifically with the 
genocidal 1982 “Scorched Earth” campaign.191 Additionally, the war pressured President 
Julio César Méndez Montenegro to sign an agreement with the military, granting them 
complete autonomy to pursue internal security matters, which institutionalized military 
supremacy over the civilian government.192 
The army also fractured society even further by forcibly requiring civilians to 
murder one another through the Civilian Self-Defense Patrols.193 By repressing civil 
society, the military preserved its status as the dominant institution within the country. 
Again, the mode-of-transition argument is validated because the military’s control of the 
transition ensured minimal civilian involvement in formulating the rules of the game.  
D. THE POST-TRANSITION PERIOD 
1. Post-Transition Period in Argentina 
Once democracy returned, Argentina was able to focus on internal matters, thanks 
largely to presidents Raul Alfonsín and Carlos Menem’s foreign policies.194 Argentina 
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made peace with its neighbors allowing it to focus on economic recovery and civil-
military relations reform. Additionally, when Argentina transitioned to democracy, the 
guerrilla conflict was over, thus allowing for a redefinition of military missions. 
Argentines, eager for democracy and accountability for the military’s actions, leaped at 
the opportunity to voice their dissent by electing Alfonsín, who had campaigned vowing 
to punish human rights violations.195  
Alfonsín’s election was a critical juncture in that it negated the military’s post-
transition strategy. The military expected the Peronist candidate to win and to respect the 
military’s hastily passed pre-exit laws, which would have minimized the prospect of 
reform. Alfonsín launched the truth commission, which brought the numerous human 
rights violations into public record.196 As a result, military rebellions occurred, 
demonstrating a lack of civilian control throughout Alfonsín’s tenure as president and 
into Menem’s term.197 Even though the military possessed the capability to usurp power, 
civil society remained mobilized and held demonstrations against a return to military 
rule.198 The military protested most against human rights trials, especially after the 
judiciary announced proceedings against lower-ranking officers.199 Alfonsín attempted to 
resolve the situation by passing the Due Obedience Law, which stopped criminal 
proceedings against service members below the rank of colonel. The significant drop in 
Menem’s popularity after his amnesty provided the military with additional evidence of 
their own unpopularity.200 
Reforms such as the National Defense Law, civilian defense ministry, and 
budgetary oversight by the Congress remained in effect under Menem, solidifying the 
institutional changes in the nature of civil-military relations. Menem’s redirection of the 
military, whereby he sent forces on international peacekeeping operations with European 
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militaries, exposed the military to Western ideals of democracy and provided them with 
an alternative mission set.201 The complete institutionalization of civilian control has 
been achieved. The military has not protested the renewal of trials for human rights 
violations after 2003. 
2. Post-Transition Period in Guatemala 
Guatemala’s 1985 transition produced continuous democratic rule, but the country 
remained at war until December 1996. Its movement toward democratic consolidation 
and civilian control of the military has been minimal compared to that of Argentina. This 
is due to the fact that the military remained very influential in government. Additionally, 
the violence and ethnic divisions prevented society from applying pressure from below.  
As the military remained the true source of governmental power, civil society’s political 
participation diminished. As a result, it took international pressure from the UN-
sponsored “Group of Friends,” and the military’s willingness to negotiate with the 
UNRG, to end the war.202 
The Guatemalan government now has some control over the military, but progress 
has been slow over a long period of time. The first president, Marco Vinicio Cerezo 
Arévalo, did not have control over the military and publicly acknowledged it; he even 
faced two coup attempts.203 Only after the peace accords, signed in December 1996, did 
civil-military relations reforms become possible. President Álvaro Arzú, elected in 
January 1996, dismantled the Civilian Self-Defense Patrols and significantly reduced the 
size of the military and its expenditures.204 However, he failed to implement all reforms, 
specifically removing the military from internal intelligence gathering and dismantling 
the EMP.205 His successor, President Alfonso Antonio Portillo Cabrera, did abolish the 
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EMP, but only by shifting personnel into the newly created SAAS.206 Portillo also rebuilt 
the armed forces to counter drug and crime issues.207 The National Police Force faces 
many challenges in providing internal security, which allows the military to remain as an 
internal police force.208 Guatemala’s geographic proximity to drug producers and drug 
markets provides enormous challenges in stopping the violence and preventing drug 
money from influencing government officials.209 These internal security concerns 
distracted Guatemalan politicians from pursuing complete civilian control of the military. 
The military remains semi-autonomous because it is not under a civilian defense 
ministry. Additionally, the Congress does not have complete budgetary oversight, 
because Guatemala’s constitution permits military non-disclosure on the basis of national 
security.210  
Civil society’s political participation, although initially high, was reduced 
dramatically and has only recently begun to rebound.211 The war served as a constant 
reminder of the fear under which Guatemalans lived. In addition to a fearful society, 
poverty and illiteracy remained high, producing conditions similar to pre-war Guatemala. 
The PDH and the truth commission’s report, Guatemala, Never Again, could have better 
affected society’s rebirth, but they were overshadowed by Bishop Juan Gerardi 
Conedera’s murder, rising crime rates, and military impunity from human rights 
violations. The truth commission identified the military as 90 percent responsible for all 
atrocities, but it did not have judicial power assigned to it, resulting in Guatemalans 
having to wait until 2009 for the first conviction.212 The 2013 mistrial of José Efraín Ríos 
Montt was a setback for accountability. However, Guatemalans appear to be taking it in 
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stride, noting that due process must be applied to all parties if justice is to be 
institutionalized.213  
E. CONCLUSION 
This thesis has addressed many factors that shaped the outcomes of 
democratization in Argentina and Guatemala. In comparing the two countries, this 
research set out to prove that civil society was critical in determining each country’s 
paths. However, after reviewing both case studies, a follow-on question emerges: Does 
civil societal participation determine democratization and civil-military relations reform, 
or does democratization and military reform in turn induce civil societal participation? 
One can make the argument that Argentine civil society spoke up continuously only 
because of certain enabling conditions. The Dirty War was over. Argentina had a history 
of democracy dating back to 1853. Guatemala remained in a long-term violent struggle 
during its transition, received extensive American intervention during the Cold War, and 
did not have any long-term periods of stable democratic rule.  
While not minimizing the challenges and accomplishments of the Argentines, 
they faced fewer obstacles than did Guatemala. Even still, this thesis has demonstrated 
the impact of civil society’s influence. The Argentines chose Alfonsín. Without their 
vote, which demanded that human rights violations be punished, there may have been a 
vastly different outcome—with the military never fully falling under civilian control. Had 
Guatemalans overcome their ethnic differences and openly challenged the military 
regime, civilian presidents may have felt more emboldened to implement reforms. 
However, Guatemalans remained too fractured and war ravaged for 36 years. 
Finally, in a global perspective, countries that transition from authoritarian rule 
must have, to some degree, significant input from their citizens. Those citizens must have 
government institutions that will acknowledge their concerns, or at least identify political 
individuals who sincerely place their country before self-interest. A government that does 
not hear from its constituents cannot act on their requests, but constituents who cannot 
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get the ear of the government may soon silence their voices altogether. Newly 
democratizing countries benefit from foreign aid that specifically targets the building of 
democratic institutions, i.e., electoral monitoring, voter education, judicial reforms to 
include courts and police training, and continual training in the civilian control of the 
military. In post-conflict theaters, where the security situation permits, military aid should 
be minimized, as militaries possessing greater strength than their civilian counterparts 
place democratic consolidations at risk.  
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